Argument #1: The argument from evil

  Perhaps the most classic and often repeated argument against the existence
of God is called the "argument from evil".  The form of the argument is as
follows:

 p) There is evil
 p) An omnipotent and all-good being would not allow evil to exist.
 c) There is no omnipotent and all-good being.
 c2) But God is understood as an omnipotent and all-good being, therefore
     there is no God.

  Clearly there is no argument with the simple first premise.  There is 
evil.  However, this is meant in many ways, each of which must be covered
to sufficiently answer this question entirely.  The first understanding
covers things which are called evil in themselves, such as earthquakes,
disease, and other such things.  The second understanding covers acts of
human evil, such as murder, theft, blasphemy, etc. 

  The first understanding of evil, however, can be dismissed from an argument
against the Christian understanding of God (which the arg. from evil hopes to
attack) by pointing out that Christians do not understand these things as being
evil in themselves.  Certainly we feel sorrow when lives are lost by these
occurences, but our sorrow says nothing about the good or evil of such
occurences.  It is also noteworthy that certain humanists do indeed call these
things evil because of their sometime devastation to human lives.  However,
lest one attack a straw man, the opinion of humanists can likewise be dismissed
from an argument about the Christian understanding of God and ethics.  Let 
this, then, be sufficient for the first understanding.  

  The second understand of evil is directly applicable to the Christian
understanding of evil, though in a narrow sense.  Certainly a man is understood
as evil when he commits evil acts.  The Bible itself explicates some of these
acts in the Ten Commandments, allowing us to judge evil acts when we see them.
The acts of angels have also been called good and evil, as Lucifer is understood
as an example of an evil angel.  A Christian understanding of evil, and likewise
an argument against the same understanding, would necessarily have to take into
account both these acts of human evil and angelic evil.  For the purposes of
understanding the argument, we will lump them together.

  Now, the second premise states that (essentially) since God is all-good, he 
would not allow evil to exist in the world if He himself existed.  Since evil 
exists then, God must not.  By dismissing the notion that God's own status as 
being all-good depends upon him abolishing evil, we would therefore establish
a harmony between the evil in the world and God's all-goodness, thus refuting
the argument itself.  With this strategy in mind, let us commence with an
investigation of the second premise.

  It must firstly be asked what is meant by the statement that God is all-good.
Virtue, in the Christian sense, is understood as adhering to a principle of 
good action.  When something is understood as being good, and is chosen, a
good act is committed.  When the same act is not chosen, we say that there is
evil.  Likewise, when some act is understood as evil and chosen, we say that
there is evil too.  Moving from the general understanding then, God can only
be called evil when He does not adhere to a good principle, or chooses a bad
thing.

  Having clarified goodness then, we find the question now becomes, what
acts does God do, and are they good?  Certainly the natural occurrences 
mentioned above are called evil, but it was already said that these are not
properly evil in themselves (according to the Christian understanding).  Thus,
insofar as these acts are acts of God, they can not be called evil either.
From this we find the first problem with the argument: calling certain acts of
God evil which are not really evil.

   To the second understanding of evil, that which is called unqualifiably
bad in Christianity, must be diverted to for a moment.  The second understanding
deals with evil acts by those other than God, meaning men and the angels. Now
these acts are evil when they are chosen by the actor and not otherwise.  A
murder committed by a man's son is not an evil act by his father, the one who
constructed the knife he used, the maker of the son's clothing, or the boys
guardian angel.  From this understanding then, we find that this sort of evil
act can not likewise be called evil acts of God.  It may be said that insofar
as God is creator, He makes it possible for the act to come to be.  This is
true, but note the analogy with the constructor of the boy's knife.  It is
the choice that is called evil, not necessarily the coming into being.

  Coming back to the question of acts attributable to God, it may be asked,
as mentioned above, whether God contributes to human evil.  Since human evil
is only such when the choice is made by the actor, and God does not contribute
to the choice, but only in the existence of the actor, and the existence of
the ability to choose, we must say that He does not. It must also be noted
that when things differ in kind, their virtues differ. Since God is different
in kind from His creations, so must His virtue differ. This then would explain
those acts which may be wrong for men to do, but not for God, since those things
are not evil unqualifiably, but only when done against God's will.  God does
nothing against His own will, and thus can not do evil.

  A final consideration is the response St. Thomas Aquinas notes in the
Summa Theologica on this question, and is similar to the final point.
Aquinas notes that when one virtue is subordinate to another, the higher 
virtue must be done.  God, then, obeys the higher virtue over the subordinate
ones, and thus brings a higher good from lesser evils.  How this compares
with my own final point can be seen in this way.  When one virtue is
subordinate to another, it is not to say that the lesser standard both is
and is not a virtue, but that the lesser virtue only holds when the higher
virtue is not applicable.  It would thus be evil to obey the lesser "virtue"
in these cases.  Said another way, the higher virtue becomes an exception
to the lesser, and when the higher virtue is applicable, the lesser is no
longer a virtue, but an evil choice.

   This then answers the argument from evil, and shows why it misunderstands
what evil is, and fails to distinguish the kinds of evil, and by whom evil
acts are chosen.  When these are examined, we find that God may act goodly,
while man and angels act badly.  

   Now, since the argument from evil is perhaps the best of the arguments
against the existence of God, it deserves a second and closer examination of
the argument and how the Christian understanding applies to it.  Below is
a very nice elucidation of the argument with some commentary on these basis.

In article <48mctr$oj8@news.asu.edu>, jjtom4@imap2.asu.edu writes:
> I'm really interested to hear what some Christians think about the
> following argument. Of course a Christian will conclude that (at least)
> one of the premises is false but which one and why? 
> 
> -------------------------------------------------------------------
> Part A:
> 1.  If the Judeo-Christian God exists, He is omniscient, omnipotent, and 
> 	morally perfect.

   The divine virtue is being spoken of here.  God may not, and is not,
held up to the human virtue, lest we ask "Does God tithe?"  "Must God
treat his mortal body as a temple unto himself?" As for the premise, it
is ok (if properly understood).

> 2.  An omniscient being will have knowledge of any potential evil.

  ... knowledge of any human evil which may be done, correct. This is a
correct premise.

> 3.  An omnipotent being can prevent any evil (any potential evil from 
> 	being actualized.)

   .. prevent any human evil which may be done, correct. This is a correct
premise also.

> 4.  A morally perfect being will prevent any evil that he knows about and 
> 	can prevent that isn't necessary to bring about a greater good.

   Not necessarily.  Here is your bad premise; this presupposes that the good
for God is the same as the good for man.  This is false, as stated above.

> 5.  An omnipotent being can bring about any amount of good without allowing
> 	any evil to exist.

   ... any amount of human good-- True, but irrelevent.

> Therefore:  If the Judeo-Christian God exists He will prevent all evil.

   Not necessarily.. it is not required by the divine standard of goodness.

> Part B:
> 1.  If the Judeo-Christian God exists there will be no evil in the world.
> 2.  There is evil in the world.
> Therefore:  The Judeo-Christian God does not exist.
> ------------------------------------------------------------

    Aquinas refuted this in what I believe to be a slightly more convoluted
way, but it's basically the same thing:  

  From Summa Theologiae, 1a, article 3: (this is, by the way, where the
Five Ways are found)

   [...]

   "Hence: to 1: As Augustine says: 'Since God is supremely good, he would
not allow any evil at all in his works if he wasn't sufficiently almighty and
good to bring good even from evil.'  It is therefore a mark of his unbounded
goodness that God allows evil to exist and draw from them good."

    Here Aquinas speaks of the divine good as the virtue which is even 
higher than human morality, such that this higher good is evidenced from the
very act of allowing evil in the world (such is a divinely good creation, to
allow men to be humanly good and evil).